Sunday, May 15, 2005

Notes on GWU-NSA Sept. 11 sourcebooks

I do not know the date/title of these documents all I have are their filenames when they are saved, so I apologize for not providing easily verifiable sites, but I assure you that none of this shit is made up, all the quotes come verbatim from declassified reports, written by CIA analysts. Other things that are not in quotes are my own questions ot myself for later, some answered some not. This is copy/pasted from a word file, so all the highlighting and other crap will most likely disappear. The overall meme that is supported through these documents is that the Pakistan actively constructed the Taliban brick by brick and dollar by dollar. Here are my favorite excerpts and unanswered questions, as well as a list of important people some that I haven't found anything out about, others I have found a little:

Tal20.pdf
Taliban takeover in Kandahar and Qalat.
Rabbani-ISI deal, rabbani agrees ISI moves in to southern and western afghan, so long as it does not challenge Ismail Khan in Horat.
Masteri
Rapheal sez in tal20.pdf : “He described Pakistani support for the Taliban and Taliban internal divisions between Jihadi fighters, those who went to Pakistani religious schools and a small but dangerous element of former Khalqis who are anti-us.”

Rapheal sez: “He basically divided the members in to two major groups: 1. The mujahideen who had fought during the soviet occupation and were more wordly and had been exposed to other groups and ideas and 2: those who attended Pakistani religious schools and who had strong ties either to GOP elements such as ISi or to pakistan’s religious parties.”
“7. (c) Said it is this latter group with Pakistani ties who have the most influence on policy and on supreme Taliban leader mullah mohammed Omar. The fighters are the ones still on the frontlines today. But they have little influence on Taliban policies.”

“10. (c) Raphel asked ___to elaborate on Pakistani support for the Taliban. ___he said it was extensive and largely provided by ISI. ____said he had spoken with MFA officials ‘who knew little about Afghanistan’ and ISI officials __________ the MFA got involved to the extent that it actually drafted letters for the Taliban. In contrast, ISI officials were well informed. Pakistani support ranged from Cash to supplies to logistical support to on the ground military/intel advisers. There were no Pakistanis actually working in afghan ministries. He said there were two sorts of Pakistani ‘soldiers’ in Afghanistan: Educated army officers with the ISI and uneducated recruits from Rural areas.”

-
’13. (c) Comment: we recently have received more credible information about the extent and origin of Pakistani assistance and support to the Taliban. Account is consistent with others we have heard.”

-WTF is GOP???? (government of Pakistan)
-WTF is MFA???


Tal29.pdf-main idea is Taliban and al qaida are foreigners in Afghanistan. As well as to win this war one must distinguish the great deal of times between civilians and al qaeda and Taliban members. It is in the US’ interest to motivate the civilian populace against qaeda not Taliban or cvilians, by illustrating that they are the true enemy. (could have been PR ploy to argue that less civilian casualties were going to happen)
10/3/2001 ???

United Front-another name for northern alliance

B(2)-page 7
“BIN LADEN’S AL QAEDA NETWORK WAS ABLE TO EXPAND UNDER THE SAFE SANCTUARY EXTENDED BY THE TALIBAN FOLLOWING PAKISTAN DIRECTIVES. IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT ON THAT ISSUE, CONSIDER THE LOCATION OF BIN LADEN’S CAMP TARGETED BY US CRUISE MISSLES, ZAHAWA(CAN). POSITIONED ON THE BORDER BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN [future pashtunistan] IT WAS BUILT BY PAKISTAN CONTRACTORS FUNDED BY THE PAKISTAN INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE DIRECORATE(ISI), AND PROTECTED UNDER THE PATRONAGE OF A LOCAL AND INFLUENTIAL JADRAN TRIBAL LEADER, JALALLUDIN (HAQANI). HOWEVER THE REAL HOST IN THAT FACILITY WAS THE PAKISTANI ISI. IF THIS WAS LATER TO BECOME BIN LADEN’S BASE, THEN SERIOUS QUESTIONS ARE RAISED BY THE EARLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BIN LADEN AND PAKISTAN’S ISI.”

Pg 7: various ethinic identities preclude a large movement toward national statesmanship. Taliban was able to unify using religion as a social control mechanism; and using al qaeda as military branch in certain skirmishes with northern alliance. Pashtuns are vying for any foothold in region between pak and afghan to create pushtunistan. These individuals were taking some orders from ISi also.

Page 7-9
-serious divisions between afghanis and al qaida/Taliban. Qaida is defined as elitists, with more education than most afghanis and Taliban.

Melmastia-afghan tradition of hospitality, cia analysts argue this is the reason qaida and Taliban were allowed to get a foothold.

Find info about Jalaludin ((Haqani)) the Jadran Tribal leader, and his relationship to the ISI, also find out ISI’s activities during soviet-afghan war.

Bottom of page 8:
“EVENTUALLY TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA WILL WAR WITH EACH OTHER. THE FEAR MUST BE THAT AL QAEDA WILL HAVE BECOME FULLY FORMED, IN SIZE, STRENGTH, AND CAPABILITIES WHICH WILL ENABLE THEM TO CONSUME THEIR HOST(ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT CONTINUE TO USE THE HANDY TALIBAN CLOAK WOVEN BY PAKISTAN TO SHROUD THEIR PROGRESS)”

055 BRIGADE-al qaida wing within taliban

Pg 10 “allowing Taliban a hpe of ultimate survival might also reduce their support, if not their rhetoric, for al qaeda.” (part of strategy involves driving wedge between bridge of al qaeda and Taliban. They think it’s a given that the afghan people don’t give a shit about al qaeda but may be more sentimental towards the Taliban)

They wanted the Taliban to work with them, actually take arms against al qaeda.

Who hosts who? Qaeda hosts Taliban or Taliban hosts qaeda
Pg 10:
“long term, to ensure the long term extinction of al qaeda in Afghanistan the Taliban must as a secondary measure, be successfully moderated or removed from office. Should the Taliban be forced to defend themselves against a disaffected al qaeda it would produce the spin-off benefit of also materially weakening the Taliban. What should follow is the establishment of a more stable coalition afghan government free of the Taliban and Pakistani interference.”

If they need the Taliban to help defeat al qaeda, why are they so intent on destroying Taliban. If not to create a legitimate international state to go through with the unocal plan.


Tal4.pdf (December 7, 1994)

GOP is referred to as the ISI verbatim.

Pg 1:
“He is worried that the gop may be seeking to ‘pacify’ Afghanistan, inter alia to open commerce from central asia to Karachi via the Heraat-Kandahar-Chamman road. He suspects that the mesteri plan will either be sabotaged or substantially altered by this undertaking.”

MESTERI PLAN-what is this?, important to afghan-pak ISi relations. Again pashtunistan is brought up

Rabbani and ISI again, find the relationship

Gulf between gulbuddin and ISI

Mentions strong resistance to ISi interventionism in Taliban by individuals in southern Afghanistan.

Complex quote:
“an afghan contrac tin Dushanbe told me this AM that there is a rabbani-ISI deal according to which Rabbani has agreed to an ISi move in to southern and western Afghanistan so long as it does not extend to a challenge of Ismail Khan in Horat. The thinking of this source is that Rabbani is exploiting the widening gulf between gulbuddin and ISI—growing out of ISI’s impression that Gulbuddin will be unable to move beyond the Kabul stalemate as it (and HG) had expected. (a us journalist in Tashkent this Am called to say that he has heard the Taliban might be moving toward Gardez—with involvement in Kavul intended.”

-Is ISI using a proxy for this land takeover?

“Aghans here in the us who claim to be in phone contact with afghans in Quetta allege that pak air force officials are readying kandahar airport for support of still larger military operations to include heavier fighting in Helmand and Farah. One afghan asserts as fact involvement of Pak military with the Taleban and that old Khalqis are serving as enforcers in Kandahar. While many/most afghan commanders would be constrained in condemning this alleged GOP intervention by virtue of their own dependence on Pakistan, there appears to be significant sentiment within the diaspora against the GOP move.”




-“Continued GOP interference in Aghanistan could lead to Afghan-Pak conflict. Moreover, I fear the implications for Mesteri’s efforts entailed in these developments. If the mesteri plan is somehow linked to this intervention, It will undermine the plan. Alternativey it could be aimed at sabotaging the plan.



Tal30.pdf (10, 2001)

Pg 1: “Pakistan introduced the Taliban to project its political influence in Afghanistan. Their plan failed after several attempts and resulted in losing control of all the factions involved. The al qaeda agenda in Afghanistan differs significantly from that of the Taliban and the Afghani people”

Pg 3: During soviet-afghan war, west wanted to maintain a policy of deniability. This meant they allowed Pakistan to administer the war, cash, and arms distribution. “It was a task Pakistan carried out with great enthusiasm and they helped themselves to a generous portion of cash and arms.

Pg 3: “Should the soviets ever leave they would have to contend with something the west did not have to deal with. It was still going to be in Pakistan, with all tides and currents of regional problems. Unlike the west, they were concerned with what would happen after the war to ensure influence over any government that came to power in Afghanistan after a soviet withdrawal Pakistan decided to directly influence the outcome.”

Pg 3: “Rather than allow the most gifted afghan commanders and parties to flourish, who would be hard to control later, Pakistan preferred to groom the incompetent ones for the role of fture leaders of Afghanistan. Being incompetent they would be wholly reliant on Pakistan for support. The principal beneficiary of this policy was Gulbadin ((Hekmatyr)).”

Pg 3: “…Pakistan also encouraged, facilitated and often escorted arabs from the middle east in to afghanistan. Eventually a special facility was constructed in Zawha(CAN), in Paktia province, with Pakistan inter-services intelligence directorate (ISI) funding. The local afghan mujahideen commander was Jalaludin((haqani))...”

Pg 3: “The civil war. In the wake of the soviet withdrawl in 1989, came civil war between the remnants of the afghan communist government and afghan mujahideen groups that were forced in to an unhappy alliance, this period involved very casualty heavy fighting under Pakistan ISI, most notably in the attacks on jalalabad.”

Pg 3: “Arabs in Afghanistan. “Vistors” from the middle east had been in evidence since the very early part of the soviet-afghan war. However, they lacked numbers, confidence, experience, or bonding ties sufficient to give them a separate identity from their hosts. This was allowed to evolve over a period of time, which was effectively the incubation of Al Qaeda. For the first time, larger numbers of arbas were observed in Afghanistan during the Soviet withdrawl. One of the key features of the Paktia(cont on page 4) border province, in which they were first established was that I had no Russians. The early phase of involvement was about perceptions rather than actions. At that point the arab visitors were largely linked and reliant on Haqani’s mujahideen in Paktia.”

Pg 4: the failure of hekmatyr: “When Kabul finally fell it was ahmad shah ((massoud)) who captured it, not hekmatyr, the incompentent zealot favored by Pakistan. Pakistan could not accept this result and the fragile afghan coalition government began another civil war, with the Pakistan stooge((hekmatyr)) being backed to seize total power in the end Pakistan was proved right about only one thing, Hekmatyr was incompetent. He was never able to wrest Kabul from massoud, despite massive logistical and material(including manpower) support from Pakistan. Against this failure it should be noted that Pakistan has lost every war it has ever fought.”

Pg 4: “…Pakistan finally abandoned hekmatyr. However, not in favor of a more rational policy, instead they set about doing the same thing all over again. They created another force they hoped to have better control over than hekmatyr’s rabble. It was called the Taliban, the Arabic name “talib” being literally translated as “asker” or “seeker”. Taliban meaning “the seekers”, signifying a student of divinity. This inspired title helped cloak pakistan’s hidden agenda in a new Islamic coat”

Pg 4: “To lead the Taliban Pakistan chose mullah mohammad ((OMAR)), who was willing to do as he was told. According to Taliban propaganda the Mullah was divinely inspired to rid afghnistan of the troublesome war and warlords. Afghanistan was blighted with both, largely due to years of civil war sponsored by Pakistan and reliant on the stockpile of arms plundered from a covert western arms pipeline from the old soviet-afghan war days. The mullah emerged with a fully functioning, fully armed conventionally equipped, fully trained military force prone to large scale conventional actions. Omar’s emergence is credited to Pakistan isi actions. The ISI pressured Haqani
To undertake action against Matun (The principal town in Khost, Paktia Province)”

Pg 4: Taliban prevail”With Haqani’s poorly trained peasant mujahideen there was both great loss of afghan life and repeated failure. In the wake of the soviet withdrawl, ISI also orchestrated and directed the same failed strategies against Jalalabad, with teven heavier afghan casualties. The repeated pronounced pattern under ISI direction has been to ignore the pooly trained guerrilla nature of the afghan mujahideen and press them to conduct a conventional-style engagement, the same style that Taliban are credited with learning form the Koran. As a result of these actions, the fully supported(by Pakistan) Taliban prevailed over the unsupported legitmate government of Afghanistan.

End of page 4: the enemy as Taliban: “Exploiting the difference between al qaeda and Taliban can be made to work against al qaeda.”

Pg 5: “Pakistan has alos lost control of the Taliban, who are proving to be both unpredictable and ungrateful. Under the shade of the Taliban umbrella the bin laden brand of extremism has been able to grown unmolested inside Afghanistan.”

Pg 5: “…chaos, its creation and exploitation should be part of allied strategy.”

Pg5: “It is also important to realize there are four very different agendas at issue”
-United Front “Also known as northern alliance, it supports an independent afghan state, Islamic in nature and based on afghan ideals. However, the conflict has more to do with deep ethnic and cultural divides between the principal groups than differences of opinion on Islamic interpretations. These are the cracks that Pakistan successfully exploited in creating the Taliban. On the ground the war between United Front and Taliban is not w ar about interpretations of islam It is about ethnic differences and historical roots. The tadjiks of the north are outnumbered by the pushtoons. While the west sees Afghanistan as a singular nation few afghans have any real grasp of this concept. To most of the pushtoons, the tadjiks are simply untrustworthy northerners unable to speak pushtu. The united Fronts area of control as gradually been eroded because they are outnumbered and poorly supported.”
-Taliban agenda “The Taliban agenda is the complete control of Afghanistan, using whatever means necessary to achieve this goal. This is principally reliant on logistic and material support from Pakistan. It had been created by Pakistan exploing powerless afghan fundamentalist individuals and factions by dangling in front of them the promise of an Islamic state molded to their design specifications. This, and cash, encouraged dnough recruits to cloak the Taliban with seemingly impeccable Islamic credentials.”
-The afghani style of islam “The fundamentalist habits of the Taliban espoused are largely alien to the majority of afghans who traditionally practiced a fairly relaxed interpretation of Islam. Afghani practitioners of islam enjoyed music, dancing, radio, and sports. The degrees of practicing muslims naturally varied between urban and rural dwellers with women at Kabul university and a more rigid use of purdah in the remoter countryside.”
Pg 5:
-The promise of the Taliban “The attraction to the Taliban among the almost destitute afghan population was less its Islamic credentials than its promise of an alternative to a protracted war. IT was at the time a conflict that had far exceeded its popular life span but was being artificially prolonged by outside sponsors in puruit of their own agenda. Whoever, while stillheaveily reliant on Pakistan support, the tlaiban had now remained in power long enough to develp an independent momentum and atuomny never envisioned by their creators. This makes it increasingly difficult for Pakistan to maintain the rigid control they had in mind. The Taliban created, imposed and recognized by Pakistan proved unpredictable and ungrateful.”
-Osame bin ladin’s Al Qaeda: “The al qaeda agenda in Afghanistan differs significantly from that of the Taliban. They are not about creating an independent afghan Islamic state. Long term there can be no room for Taliban in their ambitions. Having being artificially introduced to the region and encouraged in their ambitions so far they have grown in covfidence and stature. Taliban acceptance and approval of fundamentalist non-afghans as part os their fighting force were merely an extension of Pakistani policy during the soviet-afghan war. It is very important to realize that members of 035(or is it 055) brigade might serve with Taliban forces, but they are not in any western sense integrated they remain rather like an international brigade, different in language habit and in the interpretation of islam. Additionally their vision of the future of Afghanistan differs.”
-Pakistan agenda “Pakistan’s goals are simple the continuance of ht epolicy they have always demonstrated regarding Afghanistan. It is fialing with the Taliban and it cannot succeed under any afghan government controlled by al qaeda. The repercussions from pakistan’s attempt to manipulate the Islamic card is only just surfacing. In Islamabad they have tried ot ignore or bury the evidence for some time. It must be a deeply troubling period for General ((musharraf)) in Pakistan, who is asked to help hunt down the culprits that he helped to establish and supported. Not to support he U.S. Invites trouble and to assist the US to their aims also presents problems to Pakistan. The quandary leaves the Pakistanis confused as to how they might be absolved withoutpermanently shattering their regional aspirations or their government.”

Pg 6: “Death of ahmad shah ((massoud)). Ahmad shah was very unassuming and softly spoken(in farsi, pashtu, urdu, and French) He was the chief rival of Taliban and the chief thorn in Al Qaeda’s ambitions as well.”

Pg 7: “…murder of massoud was a no-lose scenario for Al Qaeda. General mohammad ((FAHIM)) is recoreded as the new commander of massoud’s united front. Whether he can keep it united remains to be seen. “

“Humanitarian adi. Selevctive allied humanitarian aid, strictly monitored an dbeyond Taliban control, would reap enormous benefits in the eradication of al qaeda inside afghan. Just bombs, no matter how surcgical the strike, convcys to the afgthan mind no distinction between afghan and enemy.
Talib2.pdf
-
-opening statement: “Ambassador (ret) ROBERT OAKLEY and General (ret) JOSEPH HOAR, in Islamabad for track-II meeting, met with Pakistani (Blacked out) and Oakley later met separately with (blacked out). Both meetings were private and took palce feburary 20. Ambassador Oakley prepared the following memorandum of conversation at my request.”

Second column: “They[Pakistan} were also very fearful of a possible pushtoon nationalist/islamic radical BLOWBACK into Pakistan, which already has enough sectarian/ethnic/religious problems.”

Note 4, second column: “(blacked out)[Ahmed?] said he had helped arrange for US Embassy personnel to visit HUA camps[in Afghanistan) and hoped this might help. Oakley and (blacked out) also discussed blowbacks already experienced with mujahadin groups, Afghan and Arab terrorists and NARCOTICS DEALERS, etc.”

Note 5, second column: “…Pakistani leverage over Taliban, most importantly the fact that almost all their food and petroleum comes ot them from Pakistan.”

Note 6, second column IN FULL: “6. (c) Oakley held similar discussions on the potential advantages and downsides of Taliban suces with several senior Pakistanis, including Senate President Wasim Sajjad, former national assembly speaker (FYI and newly appointed Foreign Minister END FYI) Gohar Ayub, former (and current) Finance minister Sartaj Aziz, and former Foreign minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan and Abdul Sattar. He urged each to encouragethe Nawaz Sharif Government to establish sensible realistic policies toward Afghanistan and the Taliban and to pay particular attention to ISID, which appears to be providing unquestioning support to harder liners among the Taliban, I.E. those from madrasseh and refugee camps in the Northwest Fronter Province and Balochistan. The issue appears to be not so much one of Taliban dominance of Afghanistan as how that dominance is exercised and relations with Afghanistan’s neighbors.”

Point 7, column 2:
“7. Embassy Comment: The Taliban have twice postponed the bisit to the militant camps and have not yet agreed to a date for a visit (ref B). we are unaware of any role (blacked out) may have had with the Taliban decision in principle to allow a visit. Oakley’s point about ISID is well-taken. According to (long blacked out section), ISID has advocated Pakistani recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan’s government (ref A). The MFA resisted this proposal, according (blacked out) has also claimed that ISID has successfully wareded off MFA proposals to close certain Madreasseh in the tribal agencies and near afghan border, which have been the spawning grounds for Taliban hard-liners.”


Talib7.pdf
-many references to GOP, (government of Pakistan), specifically its policy inside Pushtoonistan.

Opening summary: “…Pakistani and Afghan pashtuns are increasingly being drawn together. A process he claimed eventually have serious repercussions for Afghan sovereignty.”

-obviously Pakistan wanted to project its power into afghan, to prevent a movement towards a pashtunistan.









Important People must find info about:
Rabbani
Ismail Khan
Masteri
Raphel
Coldren
General Abdul Wali
Mahmud AhmedDirector General of Pakistan’s Inter-services Intelligence Directorate, 1999-2001
Gulbadin((Hekmatyr))-principal recipient of post afghan-soviet, Pakistan aid and clout. Fundamentalist, who supposedly boasted of throwing acid on women who did not wear traditional headscarves at universities.
Ahmad Shah((Massoud))-Tadjik commander from norther Afghanistan
Jalaludin((Haqani))-Local mujahideen commander, from paktia, belonged to Jadran tribe.





Geography:
Jalalabad
MatunThe principal town in Khost, Paktia Province




Questions:

Did Pakistan truly lose control of the Taliban, and the infiltrated factions of al qaeda? Or is this built in to be a policy of deniability for the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent land takeover of Eurasia. ?

Is there a link between pak involvement in 9/11 and the subsequent removal of western sanctions against Pakistan(left over from nuke testing)?

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